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Abstract
This research aims to explore the neural correlates involved in altruistic punishment, paro-
chial altruism and anti-social punishment, using the Third-Party Punishment (TPP) game. In
particular, this study considered these punishment behaviors in in-group vs. out-group
game settings, to compare how people behave with members of their own national group
and with members of another national group. The results showed that participants act altru-
istically to protect in-group members. This study indicates that norm violation in in-group
(but not in out-group) settings results in increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and
temporo-parietal junction, brain regions involved in the mentalizing network, as the third-
party attempts to understand or justify in-group members’ behavior. Finally, exploratory
analysis during anti-social punishment behavior showed brain activation recruitment of the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area associated with altered regulation of emotions.
Introduction
The ability to cooperate is one of the features that characterizes human beings and represents a
crucial step in social evolution: it shapes the norms that allow the creation of groups and the
development of institutions [1–2]. In social groups, adherence to shared rules and social
norms is essential for survival, and transgressors are punished for cheating even in the absence
of any personal benefit [3]. Fehr and Ga¨chter [3] defined this form of behavior as altruistic
punishment, (see also [4–5]). Various economic games have investigated altruistic punish-
ment, revealing its crucial role in maintaining cooperation among participants [6–11]. A well-
studied case is the Third-Party Punishment (TPP) game. In the TPP game a third party (player
C) observes an economic interaction between player A and player B. Player A can share part of
his own amount of money with Player B, who has a passive role and can only accept player A’s
proposal. Player C can spend part of his own amount of money to punish player A’s (unfair)
behavior, even though he is not directly affected by Player’s A moves.
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There is a wealth of neuroimaging literature that describes the neural networks underlying
TPP. Increased activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been observed among par-
ticipants making decisions about punishing defectors of social norms [12–13], while increased
activation of the thalamus, nucleus accumbens, anterior cingulate cortex, insula [11], and cau-
date nucleus have been found to reflect the satisfaction of a third-party when punishing defec-
tors [14–15]. The latter set of brain regions has been identified as the reward system [11].
Furthermore, some researchers have also associated punishing behavior during economic
games with increased activation of the mentalizing network (e.g. medial prefrontal cortex and
temporo-parietal junction), salience network (e.g. amygdala, insula) and central-executive net-
work (e.g. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex). In particular, the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex seems to be important in the implementation of intention-based
economic cooperation, and also has an important role in moral judgment, understanding and
determining moral responsibility, and assigning appropriate punishment [16].Experimental
evidence gained during cooperative vs. competitive processes has pointed to differences in
interactions with in-group members, i.e. participants belonging to the same group, and out-
group members, i.e. participants belonging to different groups [17–18]. In particular, people
tend to cooperate more in in-group than in out-group settings [19–20]. In social interactions
between different groups people tend to protect or favor, even without any personal gain, their
own group members at the expense of those of other groups [21–22]. Bernhard et al. defined
this in-group and out-group difference as parochial altruism [23] (see also [24–25]. In a previ-
ous study Rabellino et al. [26] examined this behavior in in-group and out-group game settings
where the groups differ for nationality (Chinese or Italian). Behavioral results indicated that
altruistic punishment behavior emerges as the tendency to protect in-group victims of unfair
behavior (see also [23]). The first study that explored the neural correlates of parochial altruism
[27], in which in-group and out-group conditions were composed by officer candidates ran-
domly assigned to different platoons (groups) at the beginning of the training course, revealed
that the punishment of members belonging to the same group was associated with increased
activity and connectivity within the mentalizing system. Notably, this system is involved in
predicting other people’s behavior and inferring their mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs,
desires, and intentions [28–32].
Goette et al. explored the existence of an opposite and apparently paradoxical behavior,
namely anti-social punishment, which is the tendency to spend one’s own money even to pun-
ish cooperative behavior [33]. In order to explain such unusual and puzzling behavior Herr-
mann et al. suggested that people who have acted unfairly in the past and have been punished
for that reason, may use antisocial punishment as a form of revenge on cooperators [34]. Alter-
native explanations may entail specific personality traits: individuals with a competitive per-
sonality would tend to increase the drive to maximize other individuals’ payoffs. However, the
interpretation of antisocial punishment is far from conclusive as the motivations behind this
paradoxical behavior have yet to be understood. Owing to the difficulty of reconciling this
behavior with the classical models of evolution of cooperation, it was not included in earlier
models of social behavior [34–35].
Finally, racial prejudice can also influence economic decision-making in the context of in-
group and out-group settings. Behavioral studies [36–37] have shown that social group cues,
such as a partner’s gender or ethnicity, can shape trust decisions in economic games. In addi-
tion, empathy can contribute to economic decision-making [38], and can facilitate prosocial
behavior in economic games in the form of greater cooperation or generosity [39–41].
In [26] the authors investigated and analyzed only the behavioral aspects of altruistic pun-
ishment, parochial altruism and antisocial punishment in an in-group and out-group game
setting. The aim of the present study was to focus our attention on the neural substrates
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underlying altruistic punishment, parochial altruism, and anti-social behavior in in-group and
out-group settings. The novelty and interesting aspect of this study is that the group settings
were created using the participants’ real nationality group membership:, i.e. Italian vs. Chinese.
Baumgartner et al. [27] only investigated the neural circuitry of the impact of group member-
ship, i.e. parochial altruism, on social norm enforcement, in which in-group and out-group
conditions were composed by officer candidates randomly assigned to different platoons
(groups) at the beginning of the training course. The present paper is the first to also investi-
gate the neural activity of brain areas underlying altruistic and anti-social punishment, in addi-
tion to parochial altruism. Furthermore, differently from Baumgartner et al.[27], in our study
group membership was based on the participant’s nationality.
At behavioral level we expected to replicate the results obtained in a previous study [26]. In
particular, we expected that: i. player C would punish unfair behavior by the dictator (player
A), i.e., altruistic punishment; ii. player C would invest more money to punish the dictator’s
unfair behavior if player B was an in-group member rather than an out-group member, i.e.,
parochial altruism; iii. player C would, albeit to a lesser extent, spend resources to punish the
cooperator, i.e., anti-social punishment.
In addition, in the present study we investigated the neural correlates involved in the
above-mentioned punishment behaviors. Following on previous neuroimaging studies of
behavior during TPP economic games [11–15], [42] we expected that: iv. altruistic punishment
would be associated with activation of the reward system; v. parochial altruism would recruit
brain regions involved in the mentalizing system. Lastly, for exploratory purposes, in the case
of participants who adopted this kind of behavior, as occurred in [26], we also investigated the
neural correlates underlying antisocial behavior in both the in-group and out-group settings.
Finally, given that previous studies have shown that empathy [38] and racial prejudice [36–
37] have a role in decision-making processes, we explored the role of these factors in explain-
ing the behaviors in question.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-three Italian male volunteers (age 24.56 ± 1.87 years) were recruited from among
undergraduate students at the University of Turin. We chose to include males only, in order to
avoid the effect of gender differences on cooperative choices, see [43–44]. We also excluded
students of Psychology or Economics since they might already have been familiar with eco-
nomic games. Two participants were excluded from the study because of excessive movement
(>2 mm) during the fMRI scans. The experimental subjects were right-handed according to
the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory [45] and did not have a history of neurological or psy-
chiatric disorders. None of them was taking medication affecting the central nervous system
or had any previous experience of economic games. After a detailed presentation of the study
all participants gave their written informed consent. The study was approved by the Bio-Ethics
Committee of the University of Turin.
Procedure and measures
We used the TPP paradigm. In particular, we added a third player (C) to a classic Dictator
Game, such as in Strobel et al. [11]. In a Dictator Game two players interact: player A, the dicta-
tor, and player B, the receiver. In our experiment player C watched a video of a modified Dicta-
tor Game acted out by player A and player B in the MR scanner waiting room. Here, the
experimenter read English instructions to the players, two Italian and two Chinese (confederates
of the experimenters) on how to play the game. We controlled that the experimental subjects
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were not aware that the other participants were confederates of the experimenters. We tested
this aspect with post-experiment open questions in which we asked the experimental subjects to
give their opinions about the other players (for example “What do you think about the other
players?” “Do you think the other players know each other?”). None of the experimental subjects
mentioned the possibility of the Chinese participants being confederates of the experimenter.
After the debriefing, player C read the instructions on his role in the TPP game and
answered a questionnaire to assess his understanding of the game. TPP training was per-
formed outside of the scanner to ensure that participants understood the game. A short prac-
tice session in the scanner was administered to familiarize the participants with the response-
recording system. The trial games were pseudo-randomized (software E-Prime 2.0, 2007, Psy-
chology Software Tools).
Two functional runs of the TPP were administered to each subject, with an anatomical scan
in between. In each run, subjects took part in 48 trials (repetitions of the game) in an event-
related design, composed of 24 fair and 24 unfair conditions. The order of runs was counter-
balanced across subjects. Each trial included: player A’s move (fair or unfair) presented for 4.5
sec., jittered fixation cross lasting 5 or 7 sec. and player C’s decision. Subjects had 4.5 seconds
to decide on whether to punish player A using a keypad with a scale from 0 to 4 MU (see Fig 1
for an example). Each subject’s decision was displayed on the screen. Trials were separated by
jittered inter-trial intervals (fixation cross, duration = 10 or 12 sec.). The participants did not
know the identity of players A and B, but only their nationality, which was represented by the
Italian or Chinese flag, used to manipulate in-group and out-group settings and to identify
participants’ membership. National flags may represent a contextual situation where a non-
social stimulus can effectively become equivalent to a social one [46].
Fig 1. An example of a trial used in the present study. In this case Players A and B belonged to the out-out
group condition (OUT- OUT).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166357.g001
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Four different player combinations were displayed depending on their in-group and out-
group membership relative to player C: the in-in group condition (IN-IN), where players A
and B belonged to the same group as player C; the out-group condition (OUT-OUT), where
player A and player B belonged to the out-group; (IN-OUT), player A belonged to the in-
group and player B belonged to the out-group; (OUT-IN), player A belonged to the out-group
and player B to the in-group.
At the beginning of each trial player A had an initial endowment of 20 Monetary Units
(MU) that he could decide to give (or not) to player B. Also player C at the beginning of each
trial had an initial endowment of 4 MU. In particular the experimenter told the participants
that “Player A could send to Player B some, all, or none of his sum” and that “Player C was free to
assign a number of deduction points from his endowment, from zero to 4, to Player A”. We high-
light that the experimenter, in order to avoid any bias, never defined Player A’s behavior as
“fair” or “unfair”. Following Strobel et al. [11] and Fehr & Fischbacher [7], the trials were clas-
sified as unfair ( 7 MU) or fair (8 MU) based on the amount of MU given by player A to
player B. The fair/unfair cut-off was not revealed to subjects prior to the experiment. For every
MU spent by player C, 2.5 MU were subtracted from Player A’s payoff: for example, if player C
spent all of his 4 MU (the maximum punishment) to sanction player A’s behavior, 10 MU
would be subtracted from player A’s payoff. In the experiment, player A and player B belonged
to the Italian or Chinese group. After the fMRI session, the participants were administered a
version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) [47–48] to evaluate implicit race bias towards
European and Asian faces. During testing, participants’ reaction times for two critical sets of
trials were recorded. In the first set, faces of people in the participant’s own racial group were
paired with pleasant words (congruent trials), and in the second set with unpleasant words
(in-congruent trials.) The difference in reaction times between congruent and in-congruent
trials measures implicit race bias (IAT D-score). Participants’ empathy skills were measured
using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) [49].
Participants received a lump sum payment of 20 euros for taking part in the experiment,
plus the money earned during the TPP game (ranging from 0 to 20 euros). The average earn-
ings were 32.20 euro per participant.
Data acquisition and analysis. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) responses were
measured while participants performed the TPP using a Signa 1.5 T head scanner (GE Health-
care, Milwaukee, Wisconsin) at the CTO Hospital in Turin. Head motion was restricted using
soft padding around the head. Functional data were acquired using T2-weighted Echo-Planar
Images (EPI) (TR = 2.25s, TE = 50ms, slice-matrix = 80×80, slice gap = 0.28 mm, field of view
(FOV) = 21 cm, flip angle = 90˚, slices aligned on the AC-PC line) during two functional runs.
The first four volumes of each run were discarded to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation
effects. In between the fMRI runs T1-weighted anatomical images (Sag 3D BRAVO) were also
acquired (with resolution 1 mm3; TR = 7.92 ms; TE = 2.4 ms; TI = 910 ms; BW = 195 Hz/Px;
α = 15˚).
Behavioral data. Behavioral data analyses were carried out using SPSS 20.0 (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL, USA) with α set to p<0.05 (two tailed). Altruistic punishment was studied by
measuring the nationality factor at four levels with respect to player C’s nationality (in-group
condition (IN-IN), players A and B belonged to player C’s group; the out-group condition:
(OUT-OUT), player A and player B belonged to the out-group; (IN-OUT), player A belonged
to the in-group and player B belonged to the out-group; (OUT-IN), player A belonged to the
out-group and player B to the in-group). We also calculated a repeated-measures ANOVA
with fairness at two levels (fair; unfair) and Group Membership at four levels (IN-IN), (OUT-
OUT), (IN-OUT) and (OUT-IN). To test parochial altruism behavior we used a repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA with the nationality factor at four levels: (IN-IN), (OUT-OUT), (IN-OUT) and
Group Membership and Third Party Punishment
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(OUT-IN) during the unfair condition. We then conducted a post hoc paired t-test. To explore
antisocial punishment behavior we applied a repeated-measures ANOVA with the nationality
factor at four (IN-IN), (OUT-OUT), (IN-OUT) and (OUT-IN) during the fair condition. In
case of significant multivariate effects, post hoc paired t-tests were conducted. In order to
investigate the relationship between individual characteristics, such as empathy and implicit
race bias, and punishment behavior we used the Pearson Correlation.
FMRI data. Data were analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurol-
ogy, London, UK) implemented in Matlab (Mathworks, Cherborn, MA, USA). All functional
images were spatially realigned to the first volume and coregistered to the mean image. All
images were normalized to the MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space and smoothed
with an 8 mm Gaussian Kernel, with an additional 6 mm smoothing at the first level for paro-
chial altruism (considered the complexity of in-group vs. out-group contrasts during this
condition).
After preprocessing we applied General Linear Modelling (GLM) [50] for statistical analy-
sis. At the first level, each trial was modeled by convolving a stick function with a hemody-
namic response function. The GLM consisted of a set of 17 regressors: four categorical
regressors for social group membership: (IN-IN), (IN-OUT), (OUT-IN) and (OUT-OUT)
conditions were included for each fairness condition (fair and unfair); two categorical regres-
sors for player C’s decisions (punishment and no punishment), six parametric regressors for
motion extent and one regressor for the nationality check trial.
At the second level, to investigate the neural correlates of altruistic punishment behavior,
we performed a one-sample t-test of the contrast unfair punishment vs. unfair no punishment
across all the participants. To test our hypotheses on the network areas recruited during paro-
chial altruism we used a full factorial model with four levels during the unfair condition for the
four group settings, (IN-IN), (IN-OUT), (OUT-IN), (OUT-OUT) across all the participants.
To explore neural correlates of anti-social punishment, we performed a separate one-sample t-
test of the contrast fair punishment vs. fair no punishment. This analysis was limited to those
participants (n = 10) who showed this particular and puzzling behavior. For altruistic punish-
ment and parochial altruism we used a small volume correction (SVC) with a sphere of 10 mm
radius centered on coordinates based on previous neuroimaging studies on punishment. Spe-
cifically,for altruistic punishment, we focused on: the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (10 mm
radius sphere centered on x = 2 y = 54 z = – 4 [14], the ventral tegmental area (x = 8 y = -18 z =
-10 [51], the anterior cingulate cortex (x = 0 y = 44 z = 10 [51], the left (x = 40 y = 16 z = -2
[11]) and right anterior insula (x = 32 y = 24 z = -4 [11]), for dorsolateral prefrontal cortex we
applied results reported by Knoch et al. [12] x = 39 y = 37 z = 22, Talairach coordinates con-
verted to MNI x = 43 y = 41 z = 25 using http://www.sdmproject.com/). For Parochial Altru-
ism we focused on: the left (x = -3 y = 54 z = 28 [52]) and right medial prefrontal cortex (x = 6
y = 50 z = 31 [52]), the right (x = 47 y = −61 z = 39 [52]) and left temporal-parietal junction
(x = -46 y = -63 z = 41 [52]), and the caudate nucleus (5 mm radius sphere centered on x = -14
y = 12 z = 8 based on [53] and [54]. All results are presented within a statistical threshold of
p<0.05 family-wise error corrected for multiple comparisons. For the exploratory whole brain
analyses of anti-social punishment only, we used a liberal threshold of p< 0.005 uncorrected
and a cluster size of k10.
Results
Behavioral results
In the altruistic punishment analysis there was a main effect of fairness (F(1,20) = 35.697, p<
.001) with participants investing more MU to punish the unfair condition as compared to the
Group Membership and Third Party Punishment
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fair condition (post hoc paired t-test: p< .001). There were no significant effects of players’
group membership (F(1,20) = .002, p = .969) and no group by membership interaction (F(1,20) =
1.459, p = .244).
In the parochial altruism analysis there was a main effect of nationality (F (3,60) = 3.194, p<
.049). Follow-up t-tests indicated that the participants spent more MU on punishment in
unfair (IN-IN) than in unfair (IN-OUT) conditions (t(21) = 1.994, p = .01). No significant dif-
ferences emerged from other comparisons.
Finally, the anti-social punishment analysis revealed a significant effect of nationality
(F(3,60) = 3.804, p< .015). Post-hoc paired t-tests indicated that in the fair condition partici-
pants tended to punish more frequently in (OUT-OUT) settings than in (OUT-IN) ones
(t(21) = 1.980, p = .008).
FMRI results
Altruistic Punishment. In the unfair condition we found significant increased activation
during punishment vs. no punishment in the following brain areas: ventral tegmental area
(VTA), right and left anterior insula (rAI; lAI), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) (see Fig 2 and Table 1).
Parochial altruism. Neural activity increased bilaterally in the medial prefrontal cortex
and temporo-parietal junction and the caudate nucleus (CN, see Fig 3 and Table 1) in the
IN-IN condition as compared to IN-OUT.
Antisocial punishment. Results showed increased brain activity in the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (VMPFC) in the fair condition for the contrast punishment vs. no punishment
(Fig 4 and Table 1).
Psychological traits
Lastly, to evaluate implicit race bias towards European and Asian faces we analyzed the differ-
ences of reaction times between congruent and in-congruent trials measuring implicit race
bias (IAT-D score). As mentioned previously, during testing, participants’ reaction times for
two critical sets of trials were recorded. In the first set, faces of people in the participant’s own
racial group were paired with pleasant words (congruent trials), and in the second set with
Fig 2. FMRI results: Altruistic Punishment. Brain activation maps during altruistic punishment behavior for the punishment
vs. no punishment contrast: (A) ventral tegmental area (VTA), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC);(B) right and left insula (rAI; lAI),
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166357.g002
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unpleasant words (in-congruent trials.) The difference in reaction times between congruent
and in-congruent trials measures implicit race bias (IAT D-score). Scores of this index range
from -2 to +2. A positive IAT-D score indicates that participants associated pleasant words
and own racial group faster than unpleasant words, so implicit preference for own racial
group. In the present study participants showed a slight to moderate preference towards their
own group (IAT-D score = .34;(a value of ±0.15 counts as a break point for a "slight", ±0.35 for
a "moderate", and ±0.65 for a "strong" association; see references [47–48]). None of the correla-
tions performed between the IAT and each experimental condition yielded significant results
(all rs .194, all ps .398), for detailed results see S1 Table in Supporting Information. The
number of punishment events for unfair behavior showed a positive correlation with scores
for empathy (IRI questionnaire, r = .465; p = .034) for both the in-group and out-group
settings.
Table 1. Brain regions revealed by contrasts of interest.
Region of activation Coordinates Z-score p-value
X Y Z
Altruistic punishment punishment > no punishment
ventromedial prefrontal cortex -0.7 48 -2 3.62 0.005
ventral tegmental area 2 -20 -2 3.33 0.006
anterior cingulate cortex 2 45 4 3.54 0.011
L anterior insula -33 9 -2 3.66 0.008
R anterior insula 38 15 -2 3.79 0.005
Parochial Altruism unfair in-group condition (IN-IN) > unfair out-group condition (IN-OUT)
L medial prefrontal cortex -10 58 34 2.99 0.019
R medial prefrontal cortex 12 55 28 3.17 0.012
R temporal-parietal junction 48 -56 40 6.77 0.000
L temporal-parietal junction -40 -59 34 6.06 0.000
caudate nucleus -10 15 10 2.29 0.040
Antisocial punishment punishment > no punishment
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex* 2.5 45 4 3.91 0.000
Peak activity coordinates are given in MNI space.
Altruism punishment and parochial altruism were analyzed using a small volume correction (SVC) with a sphere of 10 mm radius (5 mm radius for the
caudate nucleus) centered on the reported coordinates with a statistical threshold of p<0.05 family-wise error corrected for multiple comparisons.
* Liberal threshold of p< 0.005 uncorrected and a cluster size of k10.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166357.t001
Fig 3. FMRI results: Parochial altruism. When player C observes unfair behavior in the in-in group condition (IN-IN) the recruitment of the mentalizing
system, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and the right and left temporal-parietal junction (rTPJ and lTPJ) and, in addition, of the caudate nucleus (CN)
were observed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166357.g003
Group Membership and Third Party Punishment
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Discussion
In the present study we investigated the behavioral and neural correlates of third party punish-
ment. In particular, we focused on how in-group vs. out-group nationality membership modu-
lates the neural circuits underlying decision-making during the TPP economic game.
At behavioral level, our results confirm the altruistic punishment behavior, in line with the
relevant literature [3], [7], [26], [55], in both the in-group and out-group settings. Consistently
with previous fMRI studies [11],[14–15] which indicated the recruitment of reward system
areas during altruistic punishment behavior, our fMRI results reveal increased activation in
the VTA, rAI, lAI, ACC and VMPFC; in particular the mibrain dopamine system and the
VTA play a pivotal role in motivation and reward. Cohen et al. [56] and Strobel et al. [11] sug-
gested that activation of the insula during punishment could be associated with processing of
disgust [57–58]. Craig proposed a model of insula functioning, which entails its integration
with the ACC into a complementary system, involved in voluntary motivation, or agency, and
interoception of bodily conditions [59]. Previous studies have suggested that increased activity
in the insula and the ACC reflects the interoceptive awareness of disgust evoked by the viola-
tion of social or moral norms [60]. Furthermore, previous studies have indicated the involve-
ment of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the implementation of cognitive control and its
regulatory role in altruistic punishment [61], [11]. However, we did not observe the recruit-
ment of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. A possible explanation for this finding could be that
the experimental task used in the present study, aimed at attaining minimal cognitive compo-
nents, resulted in a reduced engagement of the brain regions involved in attention processing,
compared to those mentioned above. Another possible explanation for this negative finding
could lie in the fact that in the in-group and out-group settings participants might make their
choices without the recruitment of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for implementing inten-
tion-based economic cooperation, or moral judgment, understanding and determining moral
responsibility, and assigning appropriate punishment.
In this study, behavioral and neural experimental evidence suggest that the satisfaction
gained by punishing norm violations is the underlying motive for altruistic punishment behav-
ior. In particular, our results show that satisfaction following the punishment of unfair behav-
ior is felt in both in-group and out-group settings.
As for parochial altruism, we found that, in line with in-group favoritism [62], [20], partici-
pants were prone to protect their own group members by delivering harsh punishment to out-
group members [26], [27]. This behavior resulted in increased activity within brain regions
involved in mentalizing processes, including the MPFC and bilateral TPJ, and this change was
greater when comparing the in-group condition (IN-IN) with the out-group (OUT-IN)
Fig 4. FMRI results: Antisocial punishment. Brain activation recruitment of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex during
antisocial punishment behavior for the punishment vs. no punishment contrast in the in-group and out-group settings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166357.g004
Group Membership and Third Party Punishment
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condition. This result seems to suggest that when player C watches player A acting unfairly, he
tries to understand the intentions or goals behind the in-group member’s unfair behavior in
order to justify it. Our results are in line with the relevant literature showing that these two
brain regions are key components of the mentalizing network, involved in inferring goals,
intentions, desires, as well as more enduring dispositions of others [29–32], [27], [63–65], [28].
In addition to this network, we observed increased activity of the caudate nucleus. This brain
structure has been associated with reward processing in several neuroimaging studies [66–68].
Finally, antisocial punishment is another important aspect emerging during TPP that can
be modulated by group membership. In line with the findings of Bortolotti et al. [69], who
reported considerable antisocial punishment behavior among Italian subjects, our behavioral
results showed that player C punished fair behavior in the out-group condition more often
when players A and B, both belonged to the out-group, as compared to when player A
belonged to the out-group and player B to the in-group. These results might suggest a form of
protection across in-group members, another possible explanation is that our task and experi-
mental procedure may have evoked this competitive behavior in-group setting. This behavioral
result was associated with increased activity of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which is a
brain region pivotal for social decision-making [70–72]. Patients with lesions in the VMPFC
have been found to show behavioral impairments affecting decision-making abilities and emo-
tion processing during social tasks, including moral judgment and economic games: in partic-
ular, such patients make more irrational economic decisions compared to controls [73], [70],
[72]. Moretti et al. showed that the VMPFC represents the subjective value or desirability of
future outcomes during social decision-making in economic tasks [74]. Notably, lesions in the
VMPFC have been associated with impairments in making value-based decisions in general
[73]. Other researchers have suggested that VMPFC deficits are associated with altered regula-
tion of emotions [70]. The activation of the VMPFC emerged from this exploratory analysis
may follow on from both the regulation of emotions and making value-based decisions during
punishment of cooperative behavior; however future studies are needed to ascertain the contri-
bution of each of these processes.
As far as the personal characteristics of the individuals participating in the present study are
concerned, we found that participants who tended to punish unfair behavior more often, irre-
spective of group membership, showed a positive correlation with scores of empathy (IRI
questionnaire). Previous literature has suggested that empathy is an important factor in deci-
sion-making processes [39]. Several studies have indicated that empathy facilitates prosocial
behavior towards others in the setting of economic games, in the form of greater cooperation
or generosity [39–41]. Indeed, when people have a greater motivation towards establishing
relationships with others this make them more likely to choose economic decisions benefiting
others [75]. These findings suggest that empathy play an important role in cooperative behav-
ior and may promote altruistic punishment behavior.
Finally, the participants showed a slight to moderate preference for their own racial group;
therefore, since in the present investigation racial and nationality belonging collapse, this vari-
able could have influenced our results about parochial altruism and antisocial punishment in
relation to preference for one’s own nationality group.
A limitation of the present study is the small size and gender of the sample. In addition we
cannot exclude that the use of flags could have affected participants’ behavior. In future, it
would be interesting to use a larger sample also including female participants and including
real face to face interactions to enable the generalization, or otherwise, of our results and fur-
ther investigate the puzzling anti-social punishment behavior we observed.
In conclusion, in line with the relevant literature this study confirms the role of punishment
behavior and the recruitment of reward systems during altruistic punishment behavior in both
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in-group and out-group settings. Moreover, our findings suggest a role of the mentalizing sys-
tem and caudate nucleus during the observation of unfair behavior in the in-group setting.
These results are in line with the evolution theory according to which cultural aspects
(knowledge, norms, language, beliefs, etc.) play a key role in maintaining in-group cooperation
[76]. However, the relationships between in-group and out-group membership and their
coevolution in punishment behavior are still unclear, therefore these aspects would need fur-
ther examination.
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